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I.

INTRODUCTION

A recently identified natural resource-the orbit-spectrum-is at the center of an increasing
number of conflicts that have exposed the need
to revise the relevant regulatory system in light of
international legal principles. In determining
what kind of regulatory system is most appropriate, there are three main levels of legal discussion.
First, examination of international legal principles reveals a basic framework for an effective regulatory regime. Yet, some principles are contra-

dictory; where contradictions occur-most notably between the principles of efficient utilization
and equitable access-this article argues that the
principle of efficient utilization ought to be given
greatest credence. Second, the discussion focuses
on whether an a posteriorisystem or an a priori system is best supported by the legal principles. An a
posteriorisystem is essentially a first-in-time, first-inright method based on the publication, coordination and notification procedures of the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"); an a
priori system is a planned or engineered system
that allocates nominal orbital positions to various
countries, whether or not a country has an immediate need or capability to use the position. This
article argues that the current a posteriori system is
the most appropriate. Third, accepting that the a
posteriorisystem is appropriate, the discussion then
revolves around possible revisions to the a posteri* Adrian B. Copiz is a telecommunications attorney practicing with the law firm of McGuireWoods LLP.
I
CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 47
2 Martin A. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum
Allocation, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (1982) [hereinafter Rothblatt]. This is a scientifically derived, functionalist definition

that reflects how the dual nature of the resource dictates that
orbital-spectrum regulation considers both orbital position
and frequency.
RACHAEL E. SCHWARTZ, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:

CELLULAR

AND

SATELLITE SYSTEMS

130 (1996) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ].
4 Id. at 129.
5

RITA LAURIA WHITE & HAROLD

M.

WHITE, JR., THE LAW

AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COMMUNICATION

(1996) [hereinafter KENNEDY & PASTOR].

3

ori system. In doing so, this article proposes that
revisions should focus on the efficient utilization
of the orbit-spectrum, as can be best realized
through strong enforcement mechanisms and
stimulation of technological innovation.
As will be discussed in greater technical depth,
the limited orbit-spectrum resource' is exploited
through the simultaneous use of geostationary orbit ("GSO") and the electromagnetic spectrum,
2
which are both independently scarce resources.
The orbit-spectrum is one of society's valuable
natural resources. Through orbit-spectrum use,
artificial satellites provide numerous services to
society through many key functions including:
telecommunications, direct broadcasting and remote sensing. The GSO is especially valuable because satellites in GSO, which appear stationary to
an observer on Earth, do not need to be tracked,
provide a continuous link to Earth stations and
are generally less expensive to operate than satellites in other orbits. 3 Arthur C. Clarke, a British
military officer and science fiction author, 4 referred to the belief that three satellites placed
equidistant in GSO could provide for worldwide
communications "as the central nervous system of
mankind. '5 Not only do satellites perform vital
functions for contemporary society, but the satellite industry is a rapidly growing sector of the
global economy.6
Along with the tremendous growth in the satel-
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lite industry, orbit-spectrum conflicts have been
on the rise, stemming directly out of the scarce
nature of the orbit-spectrum. 7 For example,
PanAmSat Corp's PAS-4 satellite experienced interference" from a Russian Stationary 20 satellite.
Although a spokesman for PanAmSat said that the
interference did not affect customers, the RtIssians did not respond to initial requests from
PanAmSat to coordinate satellites. 9 In another instance, APT Satellite of China experienced interference with its Apstar IA satellite allegedly
caused by a Palapa satellite used by Pasifik Satelit
Nusantara of Indonesia. Pasifik, however, accused
APT of moving a satellite into an orbital slot at
134 degrees E.L., which was already claimed by
Pasifik.' 0 Another conflict occurred when the Malaysian Measat satellite was designed to operate on
a frequency that was already used by an Australian
satellite in close orbital proximity. Although the
problem was resolved just before launch, the Malaysian owners were in favor of launching the satellite even if the problem was not resolved. l I In
another case, Asiasat of Hong Kong had "difficult
negotiations with Thailand trying to coordinate
satellites located at 77.5 and 78.5 degrees."' 12 Because the distance between the satellites was likely
to cause "serious interference .. .Asiasat [ ] tried
to negotiate a technical solution even though it
claim[ed] first priority to the slot.""'
is estimated that by 2010 the "global satellite communications market is expected to be worth more than £ 140 billion
per year" ($200 billion based on conversion rate during August of 200 1); see also UK Satellite Companies Receive Aid, SATELLITE NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, at Vol. 23 No. 10 (describing the
potential growth of the satellite industry).
7 NandasiriJasentuligara, Director of the U.N. Office for
Outer Space Affairs, in a speech given at the McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law, in 22 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 359 (1997) ("A problem that is sure to dramatically escalate disputes related to activities in outer space is that of the
growing shortage of suitable orbital slot positions for satellites, especially in the GSO."). Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost
Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the International
Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1095,

1125-29 (2000) [hereinafter Roberts] (analyzing developing
nations' efforts to secure greater access to GSO); see also Audrey L. Allison, Meeting the Challenges of Change: The Reform of
the International Telecommunications Union, 45 FED. COMM. L.J.

491, 495 (1993) [hereinafter Allison] (discussing developing
nations' demand for greater access to "ITU resources").
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infra pp. 210-11.
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Many orbit-spectrum conflicts occur because
the regulatory system is in need of further improvement. Not only has the current system led to
practical problems in orbit-spectrum use, but also
the way the system is designed has led to abuse.
For example, entities have exploited the current
regulatory system to traffic in orbital locations and
to file too many applications for limited orbital
positions. When this happens under an a priori system, in which countries can reserve their own orbital positions, valuable orbit-spectrum goes unused or it may be used, but at a higher cost to the
end-user. A notable case of this problem is when
the Kingdom of Tonga, a small Pacific island nation, registered for 16 GSO allotments with the
ITU.14 From 1988 to 1990, when Tonga made the
filings on behalf of Friendly Islands Communications ("Tongasat"), the ITU system permitted a
country 1 5 to register a position for up to nine

years before a satellite was launched. 16 Tonga's action "outraged" the international community because it "lacked a genuine need" for so many orbital allotments in the Pacific Rim portion of the
GSO.1 7 Tonga eventually withdrew its request for
ten of the sixteen allotments, and, in 1991, it acquired six allotments.' But, Tongasat further angered the international community by leasing one
allotment to Unicom, a Colorado company, and
auctioning off the remaining five allotments "for
cific, SPACE BUSINESS NEWS, Apr. 2, 1997, 1997 WL 8214983
[hereinafter ITU System of Coordination]. Coordination operates on a nation-to-nation system of espousal in which the
U.S. took PanAmSat's complaint to the Russian government.
Id.
10 Id.; see also Crowded Orbital Slots Test ITU's Influence,
SPACE NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, 1997 WL 9051757.
11 ITU System of Coordination, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Id. In discussing the negotiations, Sabrina Cubbon, of
Asiasat, said that Asian operators are becoming increasingly
aggressive in disregarding the rules with "no intention of coordinating. They just buy satellites and launch them." Id.
Also, according to an official of a U.S. satellite firm, "[t]he
operators in Asia are thumbing their nose at the ITU." Id.
14 Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of
the Pacific Rim OrbitalSpectrum Under InternationalSpace Law, 9
N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69, 70 (1996) [hereinafter Delzeit & Beal].
15
Id. Tongasat was owned by Dr. Matt Nilson, an American entrepreneur, who retired in Tonga. Id. at 70-71; see also
Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The InternationalTelecommunications Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62 J.
AIR L. & COM. 279, 280-81 (1996) [hereinafter Thompson].
16
ITU Aims for Stiffer Telecommunications Satellite Rules,
NIKKEI ENGLISH NEWS, Apr. 2, 1997, at *1.
17
Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 71.
18 Thompson, supra note 15, at 280-81.
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$2 million per year for each orbit."1 9 INTELSAT,
"the world's largest satellite operating consortium," 20 claimed that Tongasat was engaging in
"financial speculation in the geo-stationary orbit"
in violation of ITU regulations. 2 1 Columbia Communications filed a petition with the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), which
"request[ed] that the FCC deny applications for
landing rights" 22 in the United States by any satellite operated pursuant to an allotment leased
from Tongasat. 23 In response, Rimsat, Ltd., a
company which had leased one of Tongasat's allotments, accused INTELSAT and Columbia Communications of taking anti-competitive measures. 24 The situation was further complicated
when Indonesia transferred its Palapa BI satellite
25
into an allotment already claimed by Tongasat.
This example of orbit-spectrum conflict reveals
the divergent opinions surrounding the regulation of the orbit-spectrum. Because no clear
agreement exists among industry stakeholders, reform is particularly challenging. Yet, as this article
will demonstrate, international legal principles
provide guidance in reforming the orbit-spectrum
regulatory system.
As the regulatory system and legal principles
are discussed, reference will be made to the coordination problems and the Tonga incident to better illustrate the relevant legal issues. Prior to the
legal discussion, Section II describes the orbitspectrum's physical characteristics, and Section
III examines the regulatory system from its early
development to current structure. Section IV addresses the main legal issues and then the pro19

Id. at 281.

20

Id. INTELSAT, a private company as ofJuly 18, 2001, is

an international organization with 144 member countries.
Formed by treaty, INTELSAT originally provided satellite ser-

vices on a commercial basis and divided the profits among
member countries. In the mid 1990s, INTELSAT provided

nearly two-thirds of the world's telecommunications services.
Id. at 281 n.8; see also PanAmSat Corp., Comment, Marketfor
Satellite Communications and the Role of IntergovernmentalSatellite
Organizations, submitted to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, in Dkt. No.
000410098-0098-01 (May 8, 2000) available at http://

www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/occ/oecd2000/panamsat/
panamsat508.htm; see generally INTELSAT.com, at http://
www.intelsat.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2002) (INTELSAT's affiliate, New Skies Satellites, N.V., currently operates five satellites); Newskies.com, at http;//www.newskies.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2001).
21 Thompson, supra note 15, at 280-81.
22
Id. at 281 n.10. Landing rights refer to permission for
satellites in certain positions to communicate with Earth sta-

posed revisions. These proposed revisions are important for improving the regulation of the orbitspectrum and have ramifications for space law in
general. Solving the current conflicts in the orbitspectrum by way of the international legal principles may encourage further exploration and commercialization of space by showing that it is possible to establish legal regimes in space and by affirming legal principles that will be applicable to
other space ventures.
II.

THE ORBIT-SPECTRUM RESOURCE

A.

The GSO

The GSO was first identified by H. Noordwig,
an Austrian engineer who, in 1929, determined
that a satellite at an altitude of approximately
35,800 km above the equator would appear stationary when viewed from Earth. 26 More precisely, a

satellite in GSO is located at 35,780 km above the
equator, which is 42,164 km from the center of
the Earth or a total of 6.61 Earth radii.2 7 A satellite's velocity in GSO is equal to the Earth's velocity moving in an eastward direction. 28 The period
of the orbit of a satellite in GSO is one sidereal
day, which is 23 hours, 56 minutes and four
seconds.2 9 Any orbit with this period is called a
geosynchronous orbit and may be either elliptical
or inclined to an arbitrary degree; GSO specifically referred to herein is a special case of geosynchronous orbit because it has a circular orbit and
no inclination above the equatorial plane. 30 The
circumference of the orbit, which is necessary in
tions located in specific countries.
23 Id. at 281.
24 Id. at 282. Rimsat, Ltd. defended Tongasat in part because Rimsat had a financial interest in Tongasat's allotments. Furthermore, at about the same time that Dr. Nilson,
the key founder of Tongasat, terminated his association with
Tongasat, he purchased more than 11% of Rimsat, Ltd.
stock. Tongasat's control of these orbital locations was in
Rimsat's and Dr. Nilson's financial interest. See Rick
Mendosa, Tongasat's Flawed Genius, *4-5, at http://
www.mendosa.com/tongasat.html (Dec. 30, 1996).
25 Thompson, supra note 15, at 282.
26
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an angular velocity of 72.9 x 10-6 rad/s. Id.
29 Id. This is equal to 0.9973 solar days. Id.
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determining how many positions are available in
GSO, is 264,925 km. 31 Any satellite in this position
32
has a field of view of 42% of Earth's surface.
In practice, however, the reality is never in harmony with the theory of how many satellites can
use an orbit because the satellites are subject to
various perturbing forces.33 There are triaxialities,
which are long-term, large-scale oscillations in
longitude due to longitude-dependent terms. 34
There are the solar and lunar gravitational attractions.3 5 Also, solar radiation pressure exerts an influence on a satellite's motion and position in orbit.3 6 In order to keep satellites as close as possible

to their optimum positions in orbit, there is "station keeping," which provides for corrections at
regular intervals.3 7 With improved station keeping
technology, smaller windows-the area in which a
38
satellite operates in orbit-can be maintained.
The object of station keeping is to keep the satellite in the window while using as little fuel as possible. 39 Typically, through the use of telecommands or automatic commands for emergencies,
rocket thrusters make north-south corrections
every month and east-west corrections twice per
month. 40 Current technology allows satellites to
remain in a window of 0.1 degree plus or minus in
sidered as a special form of an ellipse. An ellipse is generally
defined as a set of all points in a plane such that the sum of
all of the distances from two points in the plane, called the
foci, is constant. In the case of a circle, the two foci are in the
same position, the center of the circle. The eccentricity refers
to how close the foci are to each other. In a circle, the foci
are at the same point, and the eccentricity is thus zero. The
inclination refers to the angle in degrees as to how far off
from the equatorial plane a particular orbit is. GSO satellites
have an inclination of zero since they orbit on the equatorial
plane, having no angle relative to the equatorial plane.
CROSSWHITE ET AL., PRE-CALCULUS MATHEMATICS 262 (1988).
31 See PATTAN, supra note 26, at 43. Although the various
physical characteristics of satellites prevent defining the maximum number of satellites in the GSO, "physical interference
between satellites and radio frequency interference between
systems" demonstrate that GSO is a limited resource; see also
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longitude and in latitude, respectively. 4 1
Disregarding for the moment the effect electromagnetic spectrum has on orbit-spectrum, it is estimated that there are approximately 1800 orbital
slots of 0.2 degrees width available in GSO. 42 Generally, satellites are spaced one to two degrees
apart, but even if satellites were spaced at only 0.2
degrees, the probability that a collision would occur is extremely small. 43 An Advisory Committee

for the ITU determined that if ten satellites, each
with a 100 square meter cross sectional area, were
placed in the same two degree nominal orbital
position, the risk of a collision would only be
0.00004% per year. 44 Yet, despite the low risk of
collision with a separation of 0.2 degrees and the
trend to place satellites closer together with improved technology and station keeping capabilities, disputes arise over access to GSO because a
45
limited number of satellites can orbit in GSO;
however, demand for access to GSO is increasing.

46

A greater risk for GSO collisions comes from
debris. From the moment a satellite is launched it
encounters harsh environments and begins to deteriorate. During the ascent into space there is violent acceleration, vibration, shock and decom39
40

Id.

Id.

41
LEANZA, supra note 31, at 2243. The 0.1 degree corresponds with an area of space 150 km from north to south and
from east to west. The altitude of the satellites will typically
only vary within a space of 30 km; WHITE & WHITE, supra note
5, at 11.
42
See LEANZA, supra note 31, at 2243. The circular orbit,
360 degrees, is divided by 0.2 degrees. Id. Of course, larger
satellites in GSO would cause a reduction in the denominator. Such larger satellites could include manned space stations and solar-collecting satellites. The latter would be a satellite equipped with large solar panels to absorb solar energy.
The energy would be collected by photovoltaic cells, converted into electric energy and transformed into microwave
power. A microwave beam would be transmitted to Earth,
where it would be collected and reconverted to electrical
power by an antenna-reflector array. To obtain a useful
amount of energy, the solar panels on the satellite would
need to measure in square kilometers. The potential amount
of energy would be between 2,000 and 15,000 Megawatts.
43 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 12.
44 Id. That would equal one collision per 400,000 years.
45 Milton L. Smith, Space WARC 1985: The Quest for Equitable Access, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229 n.13 (1985) [hereinafter
Smith] (explaining that GSO is limited by volume, satellites
meeting specific orbital parameters, regulatory constraints
on frequency use and radio frequency interference).
46 Thompson, supra note 15, at 284-85 (explaining disputes arising from developing nations' efforts to secure access to GSO); Roberts, supra note 7, at 1125-29.
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pression. 47 Once the satellite enters its orbit, different parts of the satellite reach temperature extremes at the same time because there is no temperature exchange through convection; the ex48
treme temperatures can cause structural stress.
Bombardment by cosmic particles causes electrostatic discharges that can "produce short or open
circuits and burn[ ] out electronic components." 49 The effective operation of satellites may
be threatened by "lubricants evaporat[ing] in vac50
uum and caus[ing] moving parts to seize up"
and "paints and sealants perspir[ing] and
settl[ing] on sensitive optical surfaces."5' 1 Micro-

meteorites, which can strike satellites with tremendous impact, pose a risk to their structural integrity.

52

A satellite may stop operating earlier than

expected for the simple reason that it may run out
of fuel. If a satellite does not succumb to these
threats, its life span is generally ten to fifteen
years. 5 3
If the satellites were merely left in orbit, a serious problem of crowding GSO would occur. But
the general practice is to "dispose" of satellites by
either using the last bit of fuel to fire the satellite
out of orbit or by simply letting it drift out of orbit
once the fuel runs out. 54 A satellite without fuel

cannot engage in station keeping, therefore it
drifts out of orbit. 55 The first option of using the
remaining fuel to propel the satellite out of orbit
is preferred to the possible risks of collision if
satellites without fuel are permitted to drift out of
orbit. 5 6 Yet, under these circumstances, the
probability for a collision is very low. 5 7 Although

debris in GSO poses a very small risk of collision
and the total number of orbital slots is currently
sufficient to reduce the risk of collision between
operating satellites, the fact remains that only a
BERLIN,

48
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49
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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60
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B.

The Electromagnetic Spectrum

Electromagnetic spectrum refers to radiant energy waves resulting from periodic oscillations of
charged subatomic particles. 5s The electromagnetic wave comprises an electric field and a magnetic field, where each field is at a right angle to
the direction of propagation. 59 Electromagnetic

waves are distinguished by frequency; frequency
refers to how many waves occur during a given period of time and is measured in terms of cycles
per second or hertz. 60 The radio spectrum spans
from 10 KHz to 3000 GHz. 6 1 Yet, the most use of

the radio spectrum is confined to spectrum in the
10 KHz up to 40 GHz range. 6 2 Even at lower frequencies, starting at around 15 GHz, there is significant technical difficulty because of attenuation-the weakening of a signal-due to rain or
63
the constituent gases of the atmosphere.
The radio spectrum, as a resource, "has three
dimensions: space, time, and frequency." 64 Two

spectrum users can transmit in the same space
and at the same time if one is using a frequency
different from what the other is using.6 5 If, however, two spectrum users occupy the same frequency, these users must either transmit at various times or in various spaces. 6 6 Transmission
with the same frequency in the same space and at
the same time causes interference.6 7 Interference

is the superposing6 8 of one wave onto another;69
often, it disrupts information that is carried on
one Megacycle per second (1 MHz); and 1,000 Megacycles

supra note 30, at 65.

47

limited number of positions are available in GSO.
This is a real limitation to the GSO as a resource,
but the harnessing of the electromagnetic spectrum presents a greater limitation to orbit-spectrum use.

PHYSICS

286

TRINKLEIN].

supra note 8, at 536; TRINKLEIN, supra note

59, at 287 ("One thousand cycles per second equals one kilocycle per second (1 KHz); 1,000 kilocycles per second equals

per second equals one Gigacycle per second (1GHz).").
Heinrich Hertz, a German experimental physicist whom the
Hertz is named after, in 1885, provided the experimental evidence of the electromagnetic waves predicted by James Maxwell, a Scottish physicist, in 1865.
61
FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 536.
62
Id.
63
WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 15.
64
FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 536.
65
Thompson, supra note 15, at 311.
66
FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 537.
67
See id.
68
The Superposition Principle states that:
when two or more waves travel simultaneously through
the same medium 1) each wave proceeds independently
as though no other waves were present and 2) the resul-
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both waves. 70 Some interference can occur with
adjacent frequencies, but the greatest interference problems occur with the use of the same frequency.7 ' The extent to which interference will

occur primarily depends on the distance between
same-frequency transmissions and signal
72
strength.
The orbit-spectrum is a technology bound resource. 73 Yet, the technology is not predictably
bound by the resource; that is, even though there
are limits as to how much can be done with the
technology, room exists for further development.
The availability of this resource can be increased
through strategies and improved technology. For
example, technological developments allow satellites to transmit far more information at a given
frequency than they could in the past.7 4 In addition, technological advancements allow use of Vband frequencies.6 Also, for the better utilization
of the radio spectrum in light of its unique limitations, several strategies have been undertaken in
operating satellites in GSO. GSO satellite frequencies are divided into three main bands: the Cband, the Ku-band, and the Ka-band. 76 Within
each band, the range of frequencies used for uplink is different from the range used for down-link
communications, which ensures that a satellite
does not create interference with itself. 77 When
two or more satellites operate on the same band,
sufficient distance between the satellites is necessary to prevent their respective frequencies from
causing interference. Typically, satellites operating on the C-band have been spaced in increments of three to five degrees. 78 With the advent
tant displacement of any particle at a given time is the
vector sum of the displacements that the individual
waves acting alone would give it.
TRINKLEIN, supra note 59, at 244.
609 Id. at 691.
70
See FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 537.
71
Id.
72

Id.

Although technology can improve the quality of water
and facilitate extraction and transportation of it, water, unlike spectrum, is inherently a resource that can be exploited
without advanced technology.
74 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 15.
75
FCC Adopts V-Band Spectrum Plan, COMM. TODAY, Dec.
18, 1998, LEXIS, Communications News Stories. In the
United States, frequencies designated to the V-band are at
36.0-51.4 GHz. Id.
76 Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 57 & n.6.
77 Id. Up-links are signals from the Earth station to the
satellite; down-links are signals from the satellite to the Earth
station. For the C-band, 5.925-6.425 GHz is the up-link, and
73
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of improved antenna design, however, satellites
operating in the C-band are being spaced as close
together as two degrees. 79 Satellite service providers favor use of C-band because the technology
for this band is the most tested, least expensive
and least susceptible to rain and atmospheric attenuation.8 0 Improvements in the technology for
the higher frequency bands, including the Kuand Ka-bands, allow service providers to use these
bands more than they have in the past.8 1 Satellites

using the Ku-band are usually placed in between
C-band satellites, so as to make use of the space
necessarily left vacant for avoiding interference
between C-band satellites. Increasingly, though,
there are more hybrid satellites, which operate on
both C- and Ku-band frequencies.8 2 Frequency
band distribution and decisions on satellite signal
strength involve unilateral actions of nations and
corporations, bilateral and regional agreements
and, most importantly, the ITU's regulatory system. This regulatory system and its interplay with
other stakeholders shape the legal debate surrounding the use of the orbit-spectrum resource.
III.

THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

A. History
The ITU plays the central role in regulating the
use of the orbit-spectrum resource. From its roots
in 1865, as the International Telegraph Union
("Telegraph Union"), the ITU has undergone numerous transformations as the technological and
political landscapes have evolved.8 3 Twenty Euro3.7-4.2 GHz is the down-link; for the Ku-band, 14.0-14.5
GHz is the up-link, and 11.7-12.7 GHz is the down-link; and,
for the Ka-band, 27.5-31.0 GHz is the up-link, and 17.7-21.2
GHz is the down-link. Id at 57 n.6.
78
See WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 15.
Id.
Id.
81 Id. Broadband satellite service providers, such as
EchoStar and DirecTV, are using these higher frequencies.
79

80

Armand Musey, Dollars and Sense: Broadband: The Next Big

Thing?, VIA SATELLITE, June 10, 2001, LEXIS, Communications News Stories; Theresa Foley, The World's Hottest Real Estate: Orbital Slots Are Prime Property, VIA SATELLITE, Sept. 10,
2001, LEXIS, Communications News Stories.
82
See, e.g., PANAMASAT.COM, GALAXY XI, at http://
www.panamsat.com./globalnetwork/galaxy-Il.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2002). For example, PanAmSat has a number of
operational hybrid C/Ku-Band satellites, such as the Galaxy
XI at 91 degrees W.L. Id.
83 WHrrIE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 51 & tbl.2.1.
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pean nations established the Telegraph Union to
universalize their telegraph services.8 4 The Telegraph Union did not immediately regulate developing communications technologies. For example, even though the telephone was invented in
the 1870s, the Telegraph Union did not do serious work on issues relating to telephone service
until 1903.85 In that same year, the Preliminary

Radio Conference set in motion the framework
for what would later become the International Radiotelegraph Union ("Radio Union"). Established
in 1927, the Radio Union's early worked focused
8
on allocating radio frequencies.

6

In 1932, the Telegraph Union and the Radio
Union merged into the ITU, at which point the
debate over radio frequency allocation 7 and interference was already substantial. 8 In 1947, the
ITU underwent a major reorganization of its
structure, including an affiliation with United Nations as a specialized agency.8 9 Shortly thereafter,
with the launch of Sputnik on Oct. 4, 1957, the
ITU began to work on issues relating to satellite
communications. Commemorating this historic
event, the United Nations issued a General Assembly Resolution that emphasized, among other
things, that outer space exploration and use
ought to further the common interest of mankind
and peace.9 0 In 1992, the ITU approved an internal reorganization plan to keep pace with rapid
international communications technology development; the changes became official on July 1,
92
1994.91 Currently, the ITU has 189 members
and all ITU decisions are binding on member
states.
84

Id.

Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 52. Allocation refers to the designation of specific frequencies to particular services. See infra Part Il1, C.
88
Id. at 47-49.
89
Id. at 53 & tbl.2.1.
90 Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial CommunicationSatellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Purposeful Purposes", 60 J AIR L. & COM. 237, 301, 326 n.340
(quoting from Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, G.A. Res. 1962 U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., (1963)).
91
See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 31. Changes
include creating permanent "sectors" that periodically meet
to discuss matters and make changes within their respective
fields. The following are some of the sectors: radiocommunication, telecommunications and telecommunications development. Id. at 32. During the reorganization, the former In85

B.

The ITU Infrastructure

The ITU is governed by a constitution, which is
supplemented by the International Telecommunications Convention ("ITC"). 93 Both documents,
which define the rights and obligations of member states, are binding on the ITU. 94 Every four
years, the Plenipotentiary Conference meets to establish "longterm policy, elect[ ] officers, set[]
the budget, amend[ ] the Convention, and
elect[ ] the 41 members of the Council," which
then meets every year for policymaking. 95 The Office of the Secretary-General, which is led by the
Secretary-General, performs ITU's daily administrative work. 9 6 In addition, various sectors carry
out more detailed work in specific issue areas.
One important sector is the ITU-Radiocommunication sector, which is supervised by the World
Radiocommunication Conference ("WRC").
Meeting every two years, the WRC oversees technical work on radio spectrum use and makes important decisions on how orbital positions and frequencies are allocated. 97 The various sectors implement the ITU's Administrative Regulations,
which include the Radio Regulations. The Radio
Regulations, established in 1963, provide for the
allocation of radio frequencies, maintenance of a
Table of Frequency Allocations, and "assignment
of orbital positions and radio frequencies for
satellites."9 8 The basic structure of the Radio Regulations for space services is similar to terrestrial
radio regulations; however, the space regulations
are "more complex" than their terrestrial counterpart.99 Since their initial promulgation, the Radio
ternational Frequency Registration Board was changed to the
Radio Communications Service. Thompson, supra note 15, at
289.
92
ITU.INT, OVERVIEW, at http://www.itu.int/members/
index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
93 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 32.
94

Id.

95

Id.

96 Id.The current Secretary-General is Mr. Yoshio Utsumi, who was elected to the position on Oct. 20, 1998. The
Secretary-General takes a leadership role in administering
the ITU's duties and guiding policy. The Secretary General's
duties are defined in Article 11 of the ITU Constitution and
Article 5 of the ITU Convention. ITU.INT, OFFICE OF THE SEC,
RETARY GENERAL, at http://www.itu.int/osg/ (last visited Feb.
3, 2002).
97
KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 32.
98

Id. at 33.

99

See WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 97.
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Regulations for space have undergone many
changes. 100 While some ITU Administrative Regulations are not binding on member states, all the
Radio Regulations "are treaty undertakings" binding on member states.' 01
Creating the International Frequency Registration Board was one of the most important steps in
the ITU's efforts to manage radio frequency use.
The Board's functions have remained the same
since its establishment in 1947; however, its name
was changed to the Radio Regulations Board
("RRB"). Although the RRB does not have judicial power, it is characterized as a quasi-judicial
body. 0 2 RRB is quasi-judicial in that it authoritatively interprets the Radio Regulations and their
application to specific assignments. 0 3 Beyond this
role, however, the RRB does not have enforcement power. Nevertheless, RRB decisions are considered "persuasive evidence of the international
law embodied in the [binding] Radio Regulations."'1 4 The RRB comprises of five "technically
trained" individuals who are experienced with the
particular region they represent. '115RRB members

are elected by the Plenipotentiary, which also ap10 6
points the RRB Director.
C.

Regulatory Substance and Procedure

The current regulatory system employs a twotrack approach. The first track, an a posteriori system, is used for orbit-spectrum use in the C- and
Ku-bands. The second track uses an a priori system, which was designed for the emerging Kaband and Broadcasting Satellite Services. Although coordination problems certainly occur in
using the C- and Ku-bands, the significant concerns surrounding the use of an a priori system
stem from the ITU's regulation of the Ka-band
and Broadcasting Satellite Services. At the same
time, neither the a posterioi nor the a priori track
100

KENNEDY

101

Id.at 33.

102

WHITE

103

Id.

& PASTOR, supra note 1,32.

& WHITE, supra note 5, at 86.

Id. (explaining that RRB interpretations are given
such weight because nations are required to cooperate and
they "prefer to resolve disputes without primary reliance
upon binding arbitral or judicial processes").
104

105

Id.

106

Id. at 96; see also ITU.INT,

ELECTED OFFICIALS, at http:/

/www.itu.int/officials/jones/index.html

(last visited on Feb.

3, 2002) (stating that the current Director of the RRB is Mr.
Robert Jones, who was elected to the position in September

raises entirely distinct issues surrounding use of
the orbit-spectrum because the same international legal principles apply to both systems.
Whether an applicant follows the a posteriori or
the a priori track, the frequencies of the radio
spectrum must first be allocated. This complex
process involves dividing radio spectrum into
blocks of frequencies that ultimately are used by
specific services.' 0 7 For example, the ITU has allocated certain frequencies for radio broadcasting,
maritime navigation, radar, satellite communications and radio astronomy. 0 More specifically,
the ITU has allocated the C-, Ku- and Ka-bands, a
frequency block ranging from 3.7 GHz to 31.0
GHz, for satellite communications.' 0 9
Once the spectrum has been allocated, the next
step, identification of the entity that will provide
the services for the allocations, is where the ITU's
and the RRB's tasks become more complex and
more controversial. After allocation, the frequency is either allotted or assigned. 1 0 Allotment
describes the process where a block of frequencies or orbital positions''' is dedicated to a specific country or geographical region.12 Assignment, on the other hand, refers to a nation, regional organization or the ITU deciding which
company or country can use a certain frequency
for the allotted service. Allotment, and the subsequent national assignment, works well for localized services. Direct international allotment and
assignment by the ITU, however, are better suited
for international services. 1' For example, the
ITU has allocated a specific portion of the spectrum for commercial radio services. This allocated
block of frequencies is then allotted to countries,
and the countries assign specific frequencies to individual radio stations. International allotment,
on the other hand, requires the international organization, the ITU in this case, to directly allot
and assign frequency and orbital positions to the
of 1994).
supra note 8, at 540.
& PASTOR, supra note 1, at 48. Although allo-

107

FRANKLIN,

108

KENNEDY

cated categories have been established, much overlap occurs
among users of popular frequencies. Id. Additionally, countries may record their reservations with the ITU to make exceptions for use within certain frequencies. Id.
110

Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 57 & n.6.
KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 48.

'''

Id.

112

Id. at 48-49.

11-1

Id. at 49.

109
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requesting country or company.' 1 4
Prior to 1988, the ITU used an a posteriori system, 1 5 but, as of 1988, the ITU has used a twotrack system, where the satellite service provider
either acquires an assignment directly from the
ITU or from a country that has received an allotment." 6 The frequency the provider hopes to operate on defines whether assignment is acquired
from the ITU or a country. The first track, which
was used exclusively until 1988, is an a posteriori
system applicable to the C- and Ku-bands.1 17 It is,

essentially, a first-come-first-served system, in
which the ITU officially recognizes the use of a
specific orbit and frequency so long as the provider complies with applicable ITU requirements. 118 When a provider seeks rights to operate
on a frequency pursuant to the a posteriori track
(assignment from the ITU), it must fulfill three
necessary steps established in Radio Regulations,
Articles 11 and 13: advance publication, coordination and notification.' 19
Advance publication entails the service provider
submitting technical information on the satellite
system to the ITU. 120 This information is supplemented by "due diligence" information, which includes identification of the satellite network and
operator and evidence of contracts providing for
the manufacturing of the satellite and launch services. 12 1 At this time, the ITU does not have the
22
authority to verify the information provided.'
Advance publication must be provided at least two
years before the beginning of the satellite service
and, at the earliest, five years before the implementation of the satellite service.' 23 The ITU may
grant a two-year extension if the provider timely
submits the due diligence information and justifies the extension on any of the following
grounds: launch failure or a delay beyond the
provider's control; delays caused by design modifications that are required by coordination agreements; problems in meeting design specifications;
114

115
116
117

Thompson, supra note 15, at n.48.
Id. at 295.
KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 49.
Thompson, supra note 15, at 294-95, 297-98 &

n.136.
118

KENNEDY & PASTOR,

119

Id. at 58.

supra note 1, at 49.

Thompson, supra note 15, at 298.
121
Roberts, supranote 7, at 1121, 1130-31. The new due
diligence requirement is aimed at dissuading actions similar
to Tonga's creation of "paper satellites."
120

122

Id_

delays in establishing coordination; or, financial
circumstances that are beyond the provider's control. 12 4 If the service provider satisfies these re-

quirements, the ITU then provides advance publication of the assignment in a weekly bulletin,
which notifies other providers and leads to the
25
next step in the a posteriori track.'
The second and most difficult step is coordination. During coordination, providers of existing
satellite systems and the provider of the new system must ensure that no interference will occur
between the systems. But for coordination to take
place, providers of existing service must contact
the new provider within four months after advance publication.' 26 If the provider does not expect any interference, no coordination is required.' 27 This process often requires a tremendous amount of negotiation and technical adjust28
ments, and it may take several years.1

The third step, notification, occurs after advanced publication and coordination. So long as
the ITU does not find any technical problems in
the providers' agreements, it will register-or officially list-the orbital slot and frequency assignment in the Master International Frequency Register.' 29 This provides the operator with the legal
rights to use the orbital location and frequencies
when the satellite system becomes operational. If,
however, the satellite system is not registered or
even if it is registered but not operational within
the required time periods the whole process is
cancelled and the orbital location becomes available to other providers. 130 Once notification oc-

curs and the system is operational, the assignment
is entitled to "international recognition" and legal
protection.'"'
The second track, the a priori system, is applicable to fixed satellite services in the Ka-band.

32

An

a priori system is a planned, or engineered, system
in which the ITU allots a "nominal" orbital slot
with a certain arc or a portion of the GSO to each
123

Id.

Id. Previously, the time periods were six and three
years, which totals nine years. The new time requirements
are also meant to combat the creation of "paper satellites."
125
See Thompson, supra note 15, at 298.
Id.
126
124

127
128

Id.
See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 58.

129

Thompson, supra note 15, at 298.

130

Id.

13'
132

Id.

See id. at 297, 311 & n.136.
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member state. 133 When a provider wishes to use a
nominal slot, it must seek assignment from the
member country.-' 4 If the country makes the assignment to the service provider, the nominal position may be adjusted to a real position within
the arc. 135 When the a priori system was implemented, however, providers generally did not use
the Ka-band because the technology for commercial use was not readily available.' 3 6 Recently an
increasing number of satellites using the Ka-band
have been launched, and the FCC has granted additional licenses for Ka-band satellites to satellite
37

companies. 1

Despite these efforts to use spectrum assigned
pursuant to the a priori track, service providers
have used the a posterioritrack far more than the a
priori track. 1 38 The primary reason for this action

is that service providers are accustomed to using
the C- and Ku-bands, which are assigned pursuant
to the a posteriori track, and their technology was
developed for use of these bands. Yet, the a priori
track cannot be viewed merely as a theoretical
matter; it is the track used for a numerous emerging services, making it a critical concern with respect to the debate on applying international legal principles to the regulation of satellites.
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amined at three main levels. First, there are tensions between various legal principles. Second, in
light of the legal principles there is the debate on
whether to move toward a regulatory system primarily based on the a posteriori track ("an a posteriori system") or move to a system based on the a
priori track ("an a priori system"). Third, if the ITU
should move towards an a posteriori system, as this
article argues, what steps can be taken to improve
it? In the following pages, the tensions between
legal principles will be explained to underscore
why these principles support an a posteriori system,
particularly based on efficient utilization, while
paying due regard to the other principles, most
notably equitable access. Finally, Section V recommends revisions for the current a posteriori system,
some of which hint toward a future hybrid system.
Two sources establish the legal framework for

regulation of the orbit-spectrum: the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Space
Treaty") and the ITC.I3

1

IV.

THE LEGAL PROBLEM

In order to better comply with the legal framework of the orbit-spectrum while considering the
unique nature of the orbit-spectrum resource, further revision to ITU regulations is necessary. The
controversy-and need for revision-may be ex133
KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 58. Although
under development since 1947, the a priori system in 1988

was still only practically implemented for a brief time and for
a few services. See id. at 49; see also WrITE & WHIrE, supra note
5, at 90.
134
135

KENNEDY

&

PASTOR,

supra note 1, at 58.

Id.

136
See Thompson, supra note 15, at 295, 311 & n.117.
Creating an a priori system for the Ka-band may be viewed as
a political gesture to appease the developing countries because they had little chance to develop the capabilities to use
the Ka band. Id. at 295-96 & n.1 18. Operation at the C band,
the most popular, uses a cheap and developed technology,
but is subject to the a posteriori system. Id.
137 Milestones Loom for Winners of Ka-band Spectrum in LongDelayed Second Round, SATELLITE NEWS, Aug. 6, 2001, LEXIS,
Communications News Stories. In Aug. 2001, the FCC released the second round assignments for orbital locations
and Ka-band frequencies. Id.
138
Thompson, supra note 15, at 297.
139
Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 61.

Both the Space Treaty

and the ITC are binding on member countries,
which include all developed countries and many
developing countries. The two treaties create a
foundation for the international law of the orbit40

spectrum resource.
The Space Treaty became effective in 1967 and
contains many broad principles, which guided the
development of subsequent instruments of space
law and provided grounds for resolving conflicts. 1 1 Because of the broad nature of the principles promulgated in the Space Treaty, the im140 Libya v. Malta, 1985 l.C.J. 13, 29-30 (stating "multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rule from custom, or indeed in devel-

oping them"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §102(1) (1987) (providing
that "international law is one that has been accepted as such
by" custom, international agreement or derivation from general principles). Of the three sources, conventions and custom are the most widely recognized sources because the general principles derived from them have been absorbed into
customary international law. Although the conventions cannot directly bind nonmember parties, they aid the development of customary international law, which could then bind
non-member parties. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G.
MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 16, 25-26 (1989) [hereinafter BUERGENTHAL & MAIER]. Conventions, including the
Space Treaty and the ITC, are honored "pacta sunt servanda"
by the member parties. Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 75.
141
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
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plementation of these principles operates as both
a blessing and curse. The breadth of these principles provides for tremendous flexibility, which has
been both beneficial and frustrating, depending
on which side of the technological divide one is
situated. Nonetheless, the Space Treaty14 2 provisions relevant to the legal dispute and regulatory
debate over use of the orbit-spectrum are Articles
1,11 and IX. 14 3 The activities of signatories to the
44
Space Treaty are constrained by it and the ITC.1
The ITC contains the stated goals of the ITU and
specifies what measures ought to be taken to
achieve those goals. 145 If similar principles are
consolidated, the following legal duties-some of
which overlap-guide the use of the orbit-spectrum: restriction on national appropriation; equitable access while considering the special needs of
developing countries; cooperation with due regard for corresponding interests; and efficient
and economic operation.
As may already be evident, contradictions exist
between the legal principles set forth in the Space
Treaty and the ITC. These contradictions are
practically manifested in the regulatory system of

the orbit-spectrum resource. Most noticeably, the
debate is strongest between the developed and developing countries. The developed countries generally advocate the principle of efficient and economic operation (efficient utilization), whereas
the developing countries are most supportive of
the principle of equitable access. Subsequently, as
will be discussed, the way the principles are interpreted determine what system they support; consequently, this leads to what type of system the
countries will support, depending on their level of
development. The actual debate between countries operates primarily at a political level that
conveniently uses the various principles to promote the respective interests of the developed
and developing countries, including their constituents. Yet, the debate on the regulatory system's
future will not become mired in political and legal wrangling so long as stakeholders keep in
mind that orbit-spectrum is a delicately balanced
resource, that the operation of two nearby satellites on the same frequency will result in interference for both parties and that an increasing number of satellites are launched into GSO. The care-

U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 201, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 386
(1967) [hereinafter Space Treaty]. Subsequent conventions
include: Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S.
119; Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. 197; Convention on the Registration on Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695,
1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; U.N GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979); see generally Heidi Keefe, Making the Final FrontierFeasible: A Critical
Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA

any other means." Id. at art. II.

COMPUTER

&

HIGH TECH.

LJ. 345, 345 (1995) [hereinafter

Keefe].
142
Eric Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer
Space, 3J. Irr'L L. & PRAc. 359, 361-65 (1994) [hereinafter
Husby]. The Space Treaty developed from two earlier treaties, the Antarctic Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty. Id. at 362.
143
Space Treaty, supra note 141, at art. I, II, IX.
The exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be
free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
Id. at art. I. "Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the
Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation
and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.
Id. at art. IX.
144
GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P MERGES, OUTER
SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 200 (1989) [hereinafter
REYNOLDS & MERGES] (explaining that the ITC, originally enacted at the 1932 Madrid Conferences, is periodically
amended); WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 47.
145 Allison, supra note 7, at 504, 514 & n.48. ITC art. 1
provides that ITU's purpose is "[t]o promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation;" "to harmonize the actions of the nations in the attainment of those ends," "[t]o maintain and extend international
cooperation between all Members of the Union for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all
kinds, as well as to promote and offer technical assistance to
developing countries." To achieve these goals, ITC art. 4 calls
on the ITU "to coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries and to
improve the use made of the radio frequency spectrum." ITC
art. 12 establishes ITU's duty "to effect allocation of the radio
frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference... "Finally,
ITC art. 33, as amended in 1989, directs the ITC to "take into
account the special needs of the developing countries" in
providing for "efficient[ ] and economic[ ]" orbit-spectrum
use.
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fully constructed language of each instrument
should not be considered as a mere tool for political and pecuniary gain, but, more importantly, as
the ideals from which rational solutions will develop. 146 With the unique nature of the orbit-spectrum resource and the established legal principles
in mind, it is possible to construct a workable system that looks towards the future. The next section demonstrates that the most relevant legal
principles give more support to an a posteriorisystem than an a priori system. The next section will
also demonstrate that the equitable access principles do not necessitate an a priori system because
these principles can be reflected in an a posteriori
system. The following section concludes by arguing that, even though an a posteriorisystem is preferred, this system needs revision.
A.

Restriction on National Appropriation

A fundamental goal of the Space Treaty is the
elimination of "sovereignty" claims in outer
space. 147 However, a strict reading of the Space

Treaty's text reveals some ambiguity as to the signatories' intent on this issue. Although the Space
Treaty prevents national sovereignty claims, it
does not unequivocally preclude appropriation by
private individuals, companies or international organizations. Article 2 only provides that outer
space is "not subject to national appropriation."14
The Space Treaty can be interpreted as allowing
private appropriation because where the signatories intended to bar appropriation, they clearly
did so. Thus, it can be inferred from the absence
of such a bar, with respect to private appropriation, that the signatories were not opposed to the
private appropriation of outer space. However,
Article 2 refutes this argument, stating that national appropriation "shall not" be served "by any
146
Smith, supra note 45, at 247-54 (analyzing the policy
implications of ambiguity in defining the terms "planned"
and "plan" in the ITC's equitable access provisions).
147
Husby, supra note 142, at 359, 361-62.
148
Keefe, supra note 141, at 358-59 (quoting Professor
S. Gorove, Vice President of the International Space Institute, that "[a]t present, an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropri-

ate any part of outer space"); see also Glenn H. Reynolds,
Space Law in the 1990s: An Agenda for Research, 31 JURIMETERICS

J. 1, 5 (1990) (explaining that Professors Reynolds and
White's argument that appropriation by private parties is lawful).
149

Husby, supra note 142, at 362.
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other means." 149 This argument advanced by Article 2 provides that every individual or company
that makes use of the orbit-spectrum is a nationality of a given country.' 5 Thus, a private ownership claim is viewed as an extension of national
sovereignty. If that country in any way recognizes
or supports the actions of a private company or its
claims, state action may be found. 51' Moreover,
barring private ownership claims precludes a nation from intentionally using a private entity to affect an appropriation.
Although strong legal grounds exist for recognizing that outer space is not subject to traditional
property rights, it also may be forcefully argued
that traditional property rights should be recognized in outer space. If property rights in outer
space remain unrecognized, fewer incentives may
exist to explore and exploit the resources of outer
space. The need to create incentives in outer
space is analogous to grants of property rights to
promote the development of the American
West.' 52 Nonetheless, until such policies are translated into new international agreements or customary international law, outer space will be
viewed in terms of res communis in which nations
cannot appropriate a given area in space, but nations or private parties may fully exploit the resources in that given area. 15 - As on the high seas,
where no exclusive property rights attach to fishing concerns, orbit-spectrum use within the GSO
does not create an ownership right to the area of
space. Instead, application of res communis allows
for the exclusive exploitation of natural resources
54
at that location and at that time.'
In regulating the orbit-spectrum, the a posteriori
system better complies with the legal principle of
res communis by recognizing the ancient "first-intime, first-in-right" principle, 15 5 which is analogous to res communis application to the high
150
Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, passim (analyzing
Tonga incident in terms of both Tonga's and Tongasat's conduct).
151
John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp.2d 1294,
1305 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining that a court will look to
various factors to determine whether state action is implicated: public function, state compulsion, nexus and joint action).
152
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 144, at 164.
153
See Husby, supra note 142, at 365.
154
Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 68 & n.81.
155 Richard A. Epstein, Stranahan Lecture: Property Rights
Claims of Indigenous Populations: The View from the Common Law,
31 U. TOL. L. REX,. 1, 4 (1999) (explaining the literal and
common translation of "qui prior est tempore potior est
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seas. 1 56 Thus, the party that first exploits the orbitspectrum is entitled to use it. Moreover, ITU regulations support this entitlement by requiring the
providers of a new satellite to coordinate with the
providers of operational satellites in nearby positions.

1 57

An a priori system, in contrast to the a posteriaori
system, would allow for regulations that resemble
national appropriation. In the a priori system,
nominal assignments of orbital positions would essentially give each country exclusive property
rights to the GSO without the actual exploitation
of the resource, which is necessary under res communis. Countries would be permitted to follow
Tonga's actions in leasing GSO allotments for
profit as if they had property rights in the allotments. Although Tonga's actions occurred under
the current a posteriori regulations, such practices
are likely to proliferate under an a priori system.
Furthermore, Tonga's exploitation of the GSO, as
if it had an ownership interest, contravenes international legal principles and highlights the need
to further revise the regulatory system of the orbit
spectrum.
B.

Balancing Equitable Access With the
Particular Needs of Developing Countries'

Although equitable access principles provide
for "fairness and justice [by] taking all relevant
circumstances into consideration," equitable access does not mandate equal results.' 58 At the urging of developing countries, equitable access considerations were incorporated into the ITC in
1973.159 Developing countries were concerned
that the existing a posteriori system operated to
their detriment because developed nations saturated the more desirable C-band and a developing
country's deployment of its own satellite system
was "prohibitively expensive."''

61

over C-band saturation and the increasing costs
for developing

other bands are legitimate.'61

However, ameliorating these concerns does not
demand implementation of an a priori system.
The principle of equitable access is generally
agreed to be a concept of "equal legal opportunity." 162 Under the current a posteioi system every
country has an equal right and opportunity to use
orbit-spectrum. If a particular country does not
have the financial and technological resources immediately available to use the orbit-spectrum, it is
not necessarily the responsibility of the developed
countries to provide enhanced opportunity. 163 Indeed, the idea of equal legal opportunity arises
only when a country is ready to use orbit-spectrum. 164 When the country is ready to use orbit-

spectrum, the issue that arises is whether to recognize the special needs of developing countries in
their use of the orbit-spectrum. These special
needs may include the acceptance that a developing country's use of orbit-spectrum may not be as
efficient or economic as use by a developed country. 165 Thus, the principle of equitable access certainly does not require reservation of positions for
developing countries through an a priorisystem; it
only requires recognition and acceptance that developing countries may use orbit-spectrum less efficiently.
In addition, the Space Treaty's "benefit for all
countries" clause does not require the creation of
an a priorisystem or the direct sharing of benefits
on a regulated basis in order to create equitable
access. When the Space Treaty was signed and ratified, there was some concern as to the meaning
of this declaration. When the United States Senate ratified the treaty, the Committee on Foreign
Relations stated "that nothing in Article 1 . . .diminishes or alters the right of the United States to
determine how .. .itshares the benefits and re-

These concerns

jure").
See Ghen v. Rich, 8F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881) (holding that the party which first marked a whale for capture had
a priority right to the whale).
156

157 Malaysia's Binariang Woried INTELSAT Satellite Too
Close, ASIA PULSE, July 8, 1997, LEXIS, Communications News
Stories. Regarding a conflict over orbit-spectrum use, Haniff
Omar, chairman of Binaiang Sdn Bhd, owner of the Measat1 satellite, said, "We already have that slot ... it is up to the
newcomer to discuss with the incumbent. When a newcomer
comes into the scene, it has to take the matter up with the
ITU and coordinate with all owners of satellites in the surrounding areas." Id.
158
Smith, supra note 45, at 237 (arguing that equitable

access "implies fairness and justice, taking all relevant circumstances into consideration").
159
Id.
160
Id. at 232-34.
161
Id. at 232-33 & n.14-15. Predictions on when the Cband will be saturated have varied from it already having occurred to "beyond" the 1990s.
162
Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 75.
164 Thompson, supra note 15, at 300.
164
Smith, supra note 45, at 237-38.
165
Thompson, supra note 15, at 300. Dedicating use of
the orbit-spectrum to developing countries, which is less efficient and economical, contravenes the principle of efficient
and economic use. Id. See discussion infra Part D.
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suits of its space activities."' 66 The former Soviet
Union expressed the opinion that the "mankind
provisions [in Article 1] have no precise definition" and that countries' outer space activities entirely "depended on their Will."'1 6 7 Although the

statements accompanying ratification by developed countries essentially are made for political
value, these statements show a lack of support for
interpreting the equitable access clause to require
sharing. Edwin Paxon concurs in stating that nations "are under no definite obligation to share
anything beyond what they think is reasonable."'

68

Many developed countries and private entities
put forward tremendous effort and expense to establish satellite systems. However, this does not
automatically mean that they have no responsibility to underdeveloped countries. Concepts of fairness and justice underlying the principle of equitable access require addressing the concerns of
developing countries.' 69 For one thing, developed
countries must not act to deprive developing
countries of access to orbit-spectrum, so long as,
developing countries are ready to exploit the resource. Furthermore, the ITU affirmatively places
the burden on developed countries to support the
growth of the developing countries' telecommunications capabilities. 170 One way developed coun-

tries can provide positive support is through the
World Bank, which assists developing countries
with improving telecommunications capabilities.
For example, in 1994 the World Bank assisted
Uganda in acquiring a national cellular license.17
Despite the apparent lack of special provisions
to allow developing countries to acquire access to
the orbit-spectrum, which may fuel a quest for an
a priori system, plenty of opportunities exist for de166
167

Husby, supra note 142, at 364.
Id.

168
Edwin W. Paxson, III, Sharing the Benefits of OuterSpace
Exploration: Space Law and Economic Development, 14 Mici. J.

INT'L L.

169

487, 491-92 (1993).

170

See Smith, supra note 45, at 245.
See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 32.

171

SCHWARTZ,

supra note 3, at 10.

172
INTELSAT, Agreement and Operating Agreement
Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization "INTELSAT", Sept. 17, 1971, 10 I.L.M. The preamble of the INTELSAT Agreement indicates that the organization was formed tinder the principle that "outer space
shall be used for the benefit and in the interest of all countries." Id.
173 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 63.
174
INTELSAT
Approves Privatization Plan,
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veloping countries to access orbit spectrum. Until
recently, one opportunity was membership in INTELSAT, a multinational organization created for
the purpose of developing the orbit-spectrum and
making it available to all countries. 72 INTELSAT
1 73
membership was open to all ITU members,
which comprised 144 member nations as of its
privatization on July 18, 2001.174 INTELSAT "provide[d] two-thirds of the world's public satellite
75
telecommunications services" in the mid 1990s.1

Each member country contributed "at least 0.05%
of the valuation of the organization upon joining."' 176 Thereafter, each country "must make regular contributions" depending on its amount of
orbit-spectrum use. 17 7 When a country, or a private entity applying through its country, sought
access to INTELSAT's network, INTELSAT assessed various technical factors in determining
how best to provide for the needs of the applying
country. INTELSAT's network provides an affordable alternative for developing countries to access
orbit spectrum and fulfill their telecommunications needs. 178 Although INTELSAT has been

privatized, it still strives to provide access to satellite services for all countries.' 7 9 In fact, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, a separate and independent intergovernmental agency, monitors how well INTELSAT is
fulfilling its public service goals. 80
1 Arrangements
with INTELSAT, however, do not provide a developing country the independence and prestige afforded by a national satellite system. Yet, INTELSAT remains an option until a country is financially and technically ready to operate its own system. Another option for developing countries is
to subscribe to the services of other private providers.' 8 '
at http://www.spaceandtech.com/digest/sd2000-36/sd2000-36-003.shtml (May 28, 2001) [hereinSt'ACEANDTECII.COM,

after PrivatizationPlan].
175 Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 78. Currently, INTELSAT operates 21 satellites. INTELSAT, FLEET, at http://
www.intelsat.com/satellites.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). Its
affiliate, New Skies Satellites, N.V., operates five satellites.
NEW SKIES SATELLITES N.V., ABOUT NEW SKIES FLEET, at http:/

/www.newskies.com/PBFleet/fleet-front.asp (last visited on
Sept. 19, 2001).
176 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 71.
177 Id. at 72.
17' REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 144, at 215.
179 Privatization Plan, supra note 174.
180

Id.

181

Mike Mills, Ready to Launch a Global Radio Network,

WASH. POST,

Mar. 23, 1998, at F5-7. WorldSpace, a satellite
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Cooperation With Due Regard for
Corresponding Interests

The Space Treaty's requirements for cooperation and mutual assistance among countries and
the ITC's requirements for harmonization and
the coordination ensure cooperation with due regard for corresponding interests are a critical
component of the ITU's regulatory system. Although it may be argued that an a priori system
could fulfill this principle through planning, it is
now fulfilled by the current a posteriori system,
which has the critical coordination procedure to
prevent interference. An a posteriori system's coordination process directly requires cooperation
and mutual assistance among countries to prevent
interference. A central authority that dictates
courses of action would contradict the spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance in the a posteriori
system. Furthermore, an a priori system is a more
authoritative method that could result in arbitrary
evaluations. Certain types of activities, such as international aviation regulation, may require a
more authoritative approach because of significant safety issues, complex flight procedures and
numerous actors' involvement. On the other
hand, satellite use does not raise significant safety
issues and usually only two parties are involved in
any dispute. When the dispute arises from interference, it is directly within the interest of those
two parties to find a solution, and it is a waste of
resources for others to support what is primarily
in the interest of the two parties. The recent conflicts involving interference demonstrate how important it is for countries to cooperate and coordinate their frequencies. 8 2 The conflicts also
demonstrate that revisions to the regulatory system are needed, particularly enforcement options, which are explored in Section V.
D.

Efficient and Economic Operation

The principle of efficient and economic operation is closely related to the principle of cooperaservice provider, was formed with the specific intent of mar-

tion because coordination of the orbit-spectrum
promotes efficient and economic orbit-spectrum
use. For example, two satellites in close proximity
transmitting on the same frequencies may cause
each other harmful interference, potentially
preventing successful operation of each satellite
system. Lack of coordination would not only result in the inefficient use of the orbit-spectrum by
effectively leaving precious orbital positions unused, but could even entirely prevent use of the
orbit-spectrum as fully debilitating interference
may result. Therefore, whether or not an a priori
or a posteriorisystem is used, the principle of cooperation is necessary both in theory and practice.
The principles of efficient and economic operation, however, are distinguished from the principle of cooperation in that these sometimes contradictory principles assist in defining what type of
regulatory system should be used for the orbitspectrum. A regulatory system, based on efficient
and economic principles, focuses on obtaining
the most use out of the resource at the lowest possible cost. In other words, preventing orbit-spectrum from remaining fallow while demand and
technology make use possible.
Advocates of an a priori system might suggest
that an a priori system would be more efficient
since it requires careful planning of how orbitspectrum is utilized; such planning could seek to
optimize the spacing of satellites and the assignment of frequencies. To the extent that planning
could benefit utilization of the orbit-spectrum by
maximizing the number of satellites in GSO while
making the greatest use of the spectrum through
technical analysis, these arguments may have
some merit. However, with such a large presence
already in GSO, however, an a priorisystem as advocated for the benefit of the developing countries, in which positions are reserved for individual countries, fails to promote efficiency and
economy. Most developing countries use of the
GSO is or would be less efficient than developed
countries'

use

of

it.183

Furthermore,

a

States. This service provides an example of developing countries fulfilling their satellite communication needs by leasing

(last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
182 See infta pp. 207-09.
183 Many developing countries do not have the technology or cannot afford the improved antennas and transmitters
that allow smaller distances among satellites. Many developing countries with large rural areas favor use of small, inexpensive antennas, even though these antenna types require a
stronger signal from the satellite. But stronger signals require

a channel. See, e.g., WorldSpace.com at www.worldspace.com

more space among satellites; the result is a less efficient use

keting to developing countries, especially Africa, India,

China and the Americas. The company offers broadcasting
services, not just interactive telecommunications services.
WorldSpace's current satellite fleet serves Africa and Asia; it

plans to launch the "AmeriStar" satellite to serve the United
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jurimetric 18 4 analysis of channel depth for transmission at various frequencies demonstrates that
an a posteriori system, and not an a priori system,

provides for the most efficient and economic use
of the orbit-spectrum. 185 Moreover, proponents of
a posteriori system contend that this system provides a market solution to the orbit-spectrum,
which will yield the most efficient and economic
use. 186

It might be contested that the free market actually supports the actions of Tonga in leasing out
the allotments because through market mechanisms Tonga has merely transferred rights to a different user, while not diminishing the efficiency
of the resource. In fact, the FCC has been advocating and developing rules for secondary markets for domestic use of the radio spectrum in the
United States. This effort is aimed at encouraging
the maximum use of spectrum that has been licensed, yet remains unused. 187 To the extent that
there is value in advocating the free market and
encouraging the use of fallow spectrum, it must
also be noted that, first, leasing allotments clearly
contradicts the non-appropriation principle. Second, a practice of leasing would decrease the
overall efficiency of the market in terms of cost to
the end-user. The increased costs associated with
deploying a satellite system by paying an additional $2 million, for example, is a burden that
will be shifted to those who gain access to the system (just as the massive auction costs yielding billions of dollars for wireless spectrums in Europe
and the United States will be passed on to endusers, particularly if costs increase from acquiring
profit margins by leasing radio spectrum rights to
another provider). The foreseeable result with reof the orbit spectrum. See Smith, supra note 45, at 241 & n.62.
184 Jurimetrics is the application of quantitative methods
to legal decision-making. Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 70; see
generally AndrewLaw.com, at http://www.andrewlaw.com/
jurimetrics.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
185 Maximum channel dispersion is an international legal principle based on economic and efficient operation of
the orbit-spectrum pursuant to the Space Treaty and the ITC.
Channel dispersion is a function of three dimensions: depth,
distribution and directionality. Applying a formal quantitative analysis to each dimension demonstrates that maximum
channel dispersion is achieved with an a posteriorisystem, not
with the a priori system. With respect to depth, the a posteriori
track allows 500 MHz per orbital position, whereas the a priori
system allows only 2.3 MHz per orbital position. With respect
to distribution, the a posteriorisystem provides "about twice as
much" as the a priori system. It is only with respect to directionality where the a priori system is comparable to the a posteriori system because the value is the same for both. Roth-
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spect to satellite service is that unrestrained market mechanisms will create inefficiencies and decrease equitable access for the developing countries.18 8 If a developing country sought to deploy
its own satellite system, additional costs would be
incurred from lease agreements, impeding the
system's deployment. Or, if the developing country purchased services from an implemented system, which incorporated a leased allotment, the
price would be higher than it would have been
without a lease.
Although the principle of efficient and economic operation and the principle of equitable
access may not be in harmony, of the two principles, greater force ought to be given to the principles of efficient and economic operation. As discussed above, there are various options for the developing countries seeking to gain access to the
orbit-spectrum. On the other hand, there are very
limited means for accomplishing the efficient and
economic operation of the orbit-spectrum. Because orbit-spectrum is such a scarce resource and
demand is increasing, it is critical to harness as
much of this resource as possible. Deference to
the principle of efficient and economic operation
will best lead to an adequate supply of satellite service without unduly limiting developing nations'
access to orbit-spectrum.
E.

Additional Support for the A Posteriori
System

International law, as established by custom, supports the continuation of the a posteriorisystem for
regulating orbit-spectrum use. 18 9 Additionally, the
customary international law of a posteriori regulablatt, supra note 2, at 72.
186 D. da Empoli, Market Versus Non-market Decisionsfor the
Global Commons: The Case of the Orbit-SpectrumResource, THE FuTURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONs 2337, 2339
LEANZA ed., 1993).
In re Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through

(UMBERTO

187

Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary
Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 24203,

para 18 (2000) (proposing regulations for "the development
of more robust secondary markets in radio spectrum usage
rights").
188 Thompson, supra note 15, at 308-09.
189 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 175 (Feb. 20, 1969) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Tanaka). Judge Tanaka explained that two elements, corpus and animus, must be fulfilled for a particular
practice to constitute customary international law. The
corpus, a "quantitative factor .... constitutes a usage or a continuous repetition of the same kinds of acts." The animus is a
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tion may also be binding on nations that are not
signatories to the Space Treaty or ITU members.' 9 0 From the U.S. perspective, the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act ("Launch Act") supports implementation of an a posteriori system
more than an a priori system.' 9 1 The Launch Act's
purpose is to "promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity through utilization of the
space environment for peaceful purposes." 19 2 Because an a priori system would limit access to the
orbit-spectrum, its implementation would not promote outer space use; rather, the a posteriori system would allow for greater access, flexibility, and
opportunity for entrepreneurial activity.
V.

REFORMATION OF THE REGULATORY
SYSTEM

The increase in conflicts over the orbit-spectrum has led observers to call for revisions to the
regulatory system.' 93 Recent demands have not
been for a shift towards an a priori system, but
have been for changes to the current a posteriori
system. How successful revisions to the a posteriori
system are will depend on resolving critical issues,
such as the creation of paper satellites, interference problems and administrative costs.
Recent changes in the a posterioi system addressed the problems of paper satellites and administrative costs. 19 4 To address the problem of

paper satellites, the ITU decreased the maximum
amount of time that an orbital position can be re"qualitative factor" that looks to the subjective, motivating
force behind state action, which reflects a binding legal obligation-"opinion juris sive." Subjective intent may be identified from numerous signatories to the Space Treaty and the
ITC recognizing a binding legal obligation to the principles
articulated in therein. Utilization of the a posteriori system has
certainly been a continuing, prevalent practice in the international community. Also, the a posteriori system was utilized
from the beginning, prior to any regulatory system, when
Sputnik was placed into orbit without any planning of the use
of the orbit-spectrum.
190 See BUERGENIT-AL & MAIER, supra note 140, at 24. Customary international law will not be binding on a nation if
that nation consistently rejected the practice embodied in
the custom or formally "contracts out of customary international law." Id.
191

98 Stat. 3055 (1984).

49 U.S.C. §70101 (b) (1) (1994).
Roberts, supra note 7, at 1136 (summarizing proposed reforms); Jennifer A. Manner, A Survey: WRC- 2000 &
IMT -2000 the Search for Global Spectrum, 9 CoMMLAw CON192

193

sPEcrus 5, 9-22 (2001) (analyzing various points of view advocated at the World Radiocommunications Conference in
2000).

served through advanced publication before actual implementation of the satellite from nine
years to seven years.' 95 Moreover, the ITU developed the due diligence requirements to increase
the likelihood that the applicant has contracted
for the manufacturing of a satellite for the publicized orbital slot. At the WRC 2000 in Istanbul,
Turkey, satellite industry stakeholders reviewed
administrative and financial due diligence requirements. 196 Financial due diligence has met

significant resistance because it may impose high
costs; thus impeding the ability of developing nations to deploy a satellite system. As these changes
for dealing with paper satellites have been recently implemented, it may be too early to fully
assess the success of these revisions; yet, early indications from the WRC 2000 are that administrative due diligence has limited the number of frivolous filings. Although a good step, the changes do
not go far enough. Paper satellites infringe on the
restriction against national appropriation in space
and on the efficient and economic use of space by
unnecessarily reserving positions that could be
immediately used by another party. Paper satellites need to be further curtailed; to accomplish
this, more stringent regulations are necessary. For
example, the seven-year period is still too long, it
should be shorter. The appropriate length of satellite deployment depends on what is reasonably
necessary to complete the coordination process,
assuming all states cooperate. 197 Assuming a cooperative coordination process, with the industry's
Roberts, supra note 7, at 1130.
Id.
Administrative due diligence "information includes
196
identity of the satellite network, name of the administration,
country symbol, frequency band(s), name of operator, name
of satellite, orbital characteristics, name of the satellite manufacturer, date of execution of the contract, contractual delivery date, number of satellites procured, name of the launch
vehicle provider, date of execution of the contract for launch
services, a launch or in-orbit delivery window, name of the
launch vehicle and name and location of the launch facility."
WRC2000 Highlights, No. 11, May 19, 2000 at http://
www.itu.int/newsarchive/wrc2000/releases/22may.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2002). Financial due diligence could require
payment of "deposit of one percent of the cost of building
and launching a satellite" so as to "deter frivolous filings."
WRC2000 Highlights, No. 3, May 9, 2000 at http://
www.itu.int/newsarchive/wrc2000/releases/1Omay.html (last
visited Feb 3, 2002).
197
See infra Part III.B. The amount of time should be relatively short because cooperation and mutual assistance are
international law; it should be assumed that nations would
abide by it.
194
195
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increasingly proficient technical and manufacturing capabilities, five years would be sufficient time
to deploy a satellite into an orbital location. Additionally, the ITU should be given the power to investigate whether submitted due diligence information is true and accurate. If it is determined
that the information was both material and misleading, a special multinational panel should determine whether to automatically void the registration/reservation. Another possibility for deterring paper satellites is to require applicants to file
a deposit equal to a percentage19 of the satellite's
value or a set fee.1 99 This might be criticized, however, as discriminatory against developing nations
and small companies that do not have readily
available capital. This could be partly solved by
smaller companies offering collateral in the satellite or in company assets as a good faith gesture,
but this may prove terribly complex to administer.
Furthermore, it may discourage developing countries and small companies that are willing enter
into a risky venture, but are unwilling to lose corporate assets in case a good-faith effort to launch
a satellite fails. This, in turn, could be put under
the scrutiny of a multinational panel to make a
good-faith determination, yet such a determination could lead to a complex and undesirable administrative task. In any case, the shorter waiting
period and due diligence enforcement are fair
and effective means for destroying paper satellites.
The concern for administrative costs arose from
developing countries' view that their ITU fees subsidized developed nations' satellite programs, not
developing nations' efforts to launch satellites. 2 °°
Requiring each country that files an advanced
publication for an orbital slot to pay a set fee will
rectify this concern. Although this fee might have
some effect on slowing the creation of paper satellites, the ITU clearly stated that the fee is required
only to address the needs of administrative costs
and to avoid the subsidization complained of by
developing countries. The value of this new regulation has not yet been traced, but it appears to be
a good step in the direction of continuing to fund
198 Proposed percentages range from 1% to 2%. Crowded
Orbital Slots Test ITU's Influence, SPACE NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997,

1997 WL 9051757.
199

Roberts, supra note 7, at 1132-34. The chances for a

financial solution are slim because the ITU determined not
to take such an approach at the 1997 WRC meeting. Individual nations, however, are likely to raise the issue at future
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the ITU's increasingly complex tasks and to address developing nations' complaints. If there
continue to be fiscal problems, the ITU could
raise general fees as well as the case-by-case registration fees.
One of the greatest concerns that remains unresolved is a coordination problem between satellite providers. In part there is no need for increased regulation of the coordination process because it is clearly in the best interest of two individual satellite providers to coordinate, for without coordination, both will experience interference. It is only through coordination of frequencies that both providers can achieve interference
free signals. Yet, what about the cases where a provider purposefully jams the signal of another provider or where one provider places a satellite into
an orbital position before the provider registered
for that position launches it own satellite into the
position?
These are problems that even the new regulations are likely to fail to properly resolve. Instead
a meaningful enforcement mechanism is necessary to achieve satisfactory results. Unfortunately,
the ITU lacks any enforcement power. At least
two options are possible, one currently existing
and the other is not. The existing option is for the
nation, which espoused on behalf of the aggrieved party during the registration process, to
bring the case before the International Court of
Justice. 20 1 The other, not yet existing option is for
the ITU to establish a judicial body with enforcement powers. The decisions of this judicial body
would be binding on the nations that espoused on
behalf of the parties during the registration process. The situation in either an International
Court of Justice case or in an ITU judicial case
becomes more difficult to resolve if the accused
party did not use the national channel to register,
but simply launched without any kind of contact
with the ITU. Recall, a number of countries that
are not ITU members, therefore, are not bound
by the ITC's requirements. 2°2 Yet, it could be argued that a combination of the treaties and customary international law developed through the
conferences.
200
ITU to Charge Satellite Operators For System Modification
Services, SATELLITE WEEK, July 14, 1997, 1997 WL 8577890.
201
Richard Berkley, Space Law Versus Space Utilization: The
Inhibition of Private Industry in Outer Space, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J.
421, 435, (1997).
202
See infra pp. 212-14.
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repeated practice of following ITU procedures is
binding on ITU nonmember states. Despite this
potential complication, all major satellite powers
are ITU members. Thus, an internal ITU judicial
body could, in effect, operate within the satellite
community.
There are some substantial adjustments that
could be made to the a posteriori system, which incorporate an a pfiori system's planning characteristic, hinting at the evolution of a hybrid system.
The primary aim of such adjustments is to ensure
efficient and economic operation of the orbitspectrum through competitive innovation. At the
same time, equitable access would be ensured, allowing companies or countries that do not presently have the capability of launching satellites
into GSO to develop such capabilities.
At the heart of the proposed adjustments is a
transparent competitive bidding procedure similar to that used for public procurements. As positions in the GSO become increasingly scarce, a
newly formed ITU technical body would assess
and identify the frequency potential for a given
slot. Rather than using the current system where
the first provider to launch a satellite into that position acquires rights to that position, the suggested approach would permit several providers
interested in the same position to submit competitive bids. The ITU would review bids under two
circumstances: when the applicants seek an open
position and when they seek a position that has
been permanently abandoned. The bids would be
accepted and reviewed by the newly formed ITU
technical body. A precise and publicized scoring
system for the various factors would be used to
avoid accusations of discrimination. The following
are some factors that may be considered: which
provider could get a satellite into that position at
the earliest date; which satellite would have the
longest life span; which provider would maximize
channel dispersion at that particular position;
which satellite would cause the least risk for interference with the surrounding satellites; which satellite would potentially benefit the largest number
of end-users; and which proposal would contrib-

ute the most to a large satellite network. This is a
non-exhaustive list; the primary object of using a
bidding system is to squeeze as much out of the
orbit-spectrum as possible for the benefit of the
greatest number of people during a given time
period.
A more difficult challenge is to determine a response to a provider that plans to continue operations in a position with a new satellite replacing a
disposed satellite when other providers wish to
use that slot. Because the original provider may
have incurred great expense in developing its satellite service and that particular position may be
critical for networking with other satellites, it
would be both unfair and wasteful to open that
position to bidding. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a proposition to open such'positions to
bidding would be supported by the telecommunications community and developed countries. It is
developing countries that might be more supportive of the opportunity to bid on positions under
assignment. But the simple wish of one country to
use what is already being used by another country
is insufficient to pass the right of use. There might
be one opportunity, under an adjusted system, for
countries to acquire such positions. The ITU
should assess a temporarily vacated position and
establish minimum technical requirements regarding frequency use, interference and channel
dispersion for the particular use of that position.
If the original provider fails to meet the minimum
requirements for its new satellite, then, under the
principle of efficient and economic operation,
the ITU should open the position for bidding, at
which point both developed and developing
countries could bid to provide the most efficient
and innovative satellite service for the available
position.
There may be some concern about putting such
a strong emphasis on technology. As mentioned,
the orbit-spectrum is a technology-bound resource with no predetermined limits to define
how technology will allow providers to harness the
orbit-spectrum resource. 20 3 Also, the power of
technology with respect to issues on the interna-

203
See, e.g., Teledesic.com, at http://www.teledesic.com
(last visited Feb. 3, 2002). Where technology reaches its limit
with respect to use of orbit-spectrum, new opportunities will
arise. For example, Teledesic utilizes low-Earth-orbit (LEO)

work, or constellation, so as to provide wide coverage and
consistent service. Id.; see also Mike Mills, Haig Floats a HighTech Trial Balloon: Firm Looks Skyward to Different Satellite,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at F5. Another alternative, involv-

satellites to establish a communications network. LEO satel-

ing former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, is Sky Station

lites operate at low altitudes and are not in geosynchronous
orbit. They are typically integrated into a multi-satellite net-

International, which is planning to launch huge, robotic,
high-altitude, zeppelins (High Altitude Platform Systems,
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tional scale has gained increased recognition. 21 1 4

Article 9 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development states: "States should cooperate
to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for
sustainable development by improving scientific
understanding through exchanges of scientific
and technological knowledge, and by enhancing
the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative
20 5
technologies.
Regulation via technology can both operate to
preserve-or better utilize-the environment,
and it can operate as a "technology-forcing"
mechanism.2 1 16 In regard to preserving or better
utilizing the environment, a minimal technological standard that is already achievable, but not yet
uniformly implemented, could operate to achieve
a minimum standard of efficiency.20 7 A technology forcing approach can stimulate research and
development by setting a standard that has not yet
been achieved. For example, the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act required automobile
manufacturers to meet certain numerical standards for fuel efficiency and auto emissions, however, the auto industry had not developed the
technology to meet those standards and maintain
market prices for cars. 20° This mandate compelled intensive research to develop such technol"HAPS") over major cities. Sky Station plans to transmit signals for Internet data transmission, telephone calls and video
transmission. Mr. Haig's partners include Harry Darlington,
the president of the Ozone Society, and Martine Rothblatt,
whose work is referred to herein. It is expected that as many
as 250 HAPS will be deployed, with initial deployment
planned for 2002. See generally, SkyStation.com, at http://
www.skystation.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
204
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65-81 (1998) [hereinafter DAVID
HUNTER] (discussing technological development with respect
to sustainable world growth).
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Id. at 308.
Id. at 73-74.
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This raises a problem of quantity versus quality. The

205
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ogy until the standards were reached and surpassed. Likewise, setting standards and promoting
competition for the orbit-spectrum will stimulate
research and development in the satellite field.
This innovation in technology will lead to more
efficient orbit-spectrum use, potentially benefiting
a large number of people.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, utilization
of the orbit-spectrum with satellites has been
growing and evolving rapidly. Currently, the international satellite community is faced with new
challenges without obvious solutions, but familiar
legal principles offer guidance. It is critical to not
only deal with the current problems quickly, but
to do so with a view toward future challenges. Because access to the orbit-spectrum is likely to become scarcer and satellite technology more sophisticated, efficient utilization and emerging
technologies are good starting points for evaluating and revising the current regulatory system.
Not only will this benefit the satellite community,
but it will contribute to the growth of space law in
general, which will become increasingly relied
upon as we reach toward the stars.

orbit-spectrum has different types of satellites. Some are built

to transmit massive amounts of information; others, such as
U.S. military remote-sensing satellites, transmit relatively
small amounts of specialized data. Not surprisingly, devel-

oped countries with specialized satellites performing national
security tasks are unlikely to abandon these positions for
satellites that merely transmit huge amounts of raw data,
even if it is done efficiently. No obvious solution exists to this
problem in the context of a revised, technologically-guided
bidding system. A possible approach is to defer to the first-intime, first-in-right principle for non-commercial satellites that
provide a critical service, including national security, geological/oceanographic remote-sensing and weather data.
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supra note 204, at 74; see also Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).

